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Human Security’s Coming of Age
I. Introduction
Early attempts to describe and define human security linked its emergence 
to the gradual shift in security studies(2) that began in late 1970s and continued 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, away from the narrow focus on military 
security and states and towards a broader conceptualization of security that 
incorporated non-traditional elements such as economic, environmental, or 
socio-cultural, and expanded participation to non-state actors.(3) Similarities and 
differences between distinct conceptions of security from common to 
comprehensive, and from cooperative to global were drawn. In the field of 
development studies, human security was seen as the natural successor in a line 
of progressive approaches that evolved from economic, to social, and its 
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immediate predecessor of sustainable development. 
Against the background of a growing list of neologisms describing different 
contexts, challenges and aims of security, the question naturally appeared of 
whether human security was truly a new way of understanding (in)security or 
whether it was just another catch-phrase that captured new (if, superficial) 
aspects but which would eventually fade away once its heyday had passed 
(Paris, 2001). This article engages with this question and seeks to provide a 
conclusive answer. After briefly tracing the main trends and arguments that have 
been put forward by both proponents and critics in the past two decades, it 
engages with the issues and aspects that have been left out of the debate, either 
or not intentionally. The argument is that at present, human security fails to 
represent a real shift in thinking about security and that, unless it broadens the 
scope of analysis and engagement to include fundamental ethical and practical 
questions (i.e., social progress through economic development and growth, the 
West as the yardstick for the Rest, the relationship between “humanity” and 
“security”), it faces the prospect of the dust-bin of history, without having made 
a meaningful theoretical or practical contribution to our world.
II. Two Decades of Debate: Three Main Angles
The past two decades have seen spirited debates about the content and 
nature of human security, and significant contributions have been made along all 
the three main “takes” on it. The first, emancipatory take, with its practice and 
policy-oriented focus, has largely sought to work within the frame and the 
confines of existent policies and politics in order to make a tangible change in 
the lives of those most affected by human insecurity. The second, critical 
reaction to the emancipatory take, has emphasized the ways in which the 
practice of human security within existing ideological and institutional 
framework contributes to the strengthening of those very structures and actors 
that are primarily responsible for human insecurity, in effect representing “a 
band-aid solution” to what increasingly looks like a hemorrhage. The third, post-
structural take, emphasizes the need to stop trying to “fit” human security within 
67
Human Security’s Coming of Age
the current assumptions and parameters that define and delimit our 
understanding of security, and instead try to devise new ones that are not only 
better, but also uniquely suited to those completely new problems we face today.
The limited scope of this paper does not allow me to go into further details 
on any of these three understandings of human security, but I wish to add two 
further comments here: first, despite the fact that these interpretations (and the 
subdivisions they each contain) have tended to criticize one another sometimes 
to the point of mutual dismissal, it is my firm belief that they are all equally 
valuable, as they collectively stimulate us to continue thinking about what 
security should mean in the 21st century, and individually, in their own way, 
work towards making the world a better place. Second, so far these approaches 
have failed to create a true alternative to the way in which we think about and 
approach security, overall merely contributing to a “rebranding of security than 
a shift in the general thinking of what constitutes security and the ultimate 
referent of security”, as Hynek and Chandler (2011, pp. 4-5) rightly put it.
Conceptually what is required of a critical human security is to forge new 
assumptions and views of security that lay the foundations for a different 
security culture. Security became the main aim of government following a 
competition for resources. As this competition is set to intensify due to 
increasing global population and the pressures this places on natural resources, 
we need to forge not only a framework that ensures the sustainable management 
of these resources, but also a culture of sharing and cooperation among people 
that the current (competition/enemy-focused) security culture stifles.
Recently efforts have been undertaken to fundamentally and critically 
rethink human security in a way that breaks with or removes these old 
assumptions it has come to incorporate. Giorgio Shani (2014), Mustapha Kamal 
Pasha (2013), David Chandler (2011) and their collaborators have pointed us in 
the right direction. Overall, their most recent contributions seek to incorporate 
“difference” (identified in contexts such as the post-secular, the post-liberal, the 
trans-cultural, etc.) into the study of security and especially the IR field, in ways 
that move beyond the traditional (liberal) assumptions and established 
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Taking these efforts as a promising step, below I elaborate on three issues 
that the human security debate has so far largely neglected and which require 
(further) investigation. Inquiring deeper into the nature of the relationship 
between human security and these three aspects is not only timely, but 
imperative, if the concept is to make a meaningful contribution in opening up 
the debate about and the search for alternative approaches to our current security 
problems.
1. Social Progress Through Economic Development and Growth
Despite the emergence of the human security concept within the UNDP 
context, there is still little inquiry into the degree to which human security 
inherits from the development approach its thinking and assumptions of social 
progress that is to be attained through economic development and growth. With 
few recent exceptions there has been little recognition of just how quickly 
human security incorporated the “givens” of the existent international political 
and economic institutions. 
The foundation of current (neoclassical) economic policies both in the North 
and in the global South rest on the view that emancipation and empowerment 
(understood as the search for security) depend on and are equivalent to material 
betterment. Besides the difficulty of figuring out what exactly emancipation and 
empowerment mean in different parts of the world, as pointed out by Pasha 
(1996), what is extremely dangerous about this progressive view is the fact that 
it problematizes (in quite familiar ways) economic underdevelopment, thereby 
legitimizing the discourses of securitization against the South and justifying 
intervention through prescriptions for “remedy” by a “developed” West (either 
directly through bilateral economic aid and cooperation, or indirectly through 
international monetary and financial institutions).
This assumption of economic growth as path to social progress is one that 
has emerged in the Western context of modernization,(4) and that was later 
gradually exported to the Rest through sophisticated and long term colonial 
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policies of development (Kothari, 2005). Post WWII, this assumption was first 
reinforced in the West through the European economic reconstruction and 
development, and later the economic integration projects. Economic growth has 
helped bring lasting peace to Europe, although this has not solved the politico-
strategic dilemma that has haunted it for centuries.
The development field that emerged from the ashes of colonial policies 
(whether in its social, sustainable or human formulations) is built on this very 
assumption. Achieving social progress through economic development and 
growth might (arguably) have been successful in the European case, but this 
cannot be argued elsewhere. That is because post WWII international 
development has, more than anything else, exported the insecurities and tensions 
inherent in the Western model to the rest of the world, working to weaken and 
destabilize, rather than strengthen it.
Moreover, as Heloise Weber (2013) has recently argued, under the influence 
of narrow geo-strategic and economic interests of Western states, the political 
and social struggles in the Rest have been misrepresented as “reflect[ing] the 
need for development, rather than [that] such crises and insecurities are 
constituted through development processes” (p. 33). The global politics of 
poverty and development, the social construction of the international and the 
global, as well as the de-politicization of capitalism (portrayed as a simple 
economic project) have led to the opening up of spaces for intervention that 
“justify and legitimize the further entrenchment of neoliberal policies together 
with concerted efforts to transform subjectivities in accordance with liberal 
individualist - and reductionist- assumptions of the developmental subject”, that 
leave the “self and others’ lived experiences” out of the debate (p. 33).
One problem closely linked with this belief in economic growth that has 
Discursively portrayed as the movement for liberation from the “shackles of tradition and 
religion”, the political resistance against absolutist monarchy and its abuses was inextricably 
linked with the economic changes taking place, i.e., the rise of the entrepreneurial middle class 
and the “commodification of the commons (and the self)” proliferated through the capitalist 
system.
(4)
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severe implications for human security is the threat of nuclearism in neoliberal 
times. I am not referring here to the danger posed by the misappropriation and 
use of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups; rather, I am referring to the link that 
has been made between nuclear technology and neoliberal economics. This 
progressive view argues that nuclear power, which is cheap and stable, is a vital 
condition for the continued growth of economies, and allows for the 
commercialization of nuclear technology for non-military use and thus, the 
proliferation of nuclear technology. The danger lies not only in the possibility of 
a return to super-power confrontational politics (in a fundamentally unchanged 
world of security concerns focused on identification of enemies to territorial and 
individualistic ownership), but also as the 3/11 triple disasters in Japan have 
shown, a very real possibility even in peaceful times. Consequently, it is 
extremely worrying that nuclear technology is portrayed as a desirable source of 
energy, cast as justifiable against the need to develop renewable sources of 
energy. 
The lesson from this is that whatever solution we might come up with today, 
it might not be the silver bullet that solves a certain inherent dilemma but just a 
way to overcome a stalemate, one that potentially creates new and different 
problems on its own while still leaving us with the dilemma unresolved. With 
her amazing power of foresight Arendt (1965) had argued that “[e]conomic 
growth may one day turn out to be a curse rather than a good, and under no 
conditions can it either lead to freedom or constitute a proof of its existence” 
(pp. 219-20).
Within the field of economics there is an ongoing (generational) debate 
about the limits of economic growth, with younger scholars acknowledging it 
against the reality of limited resources (while for the older generation this 
continues to represent a “cultural” challenge) and parallel efforts are undertaken 
to think beyond the status-quo and towards a post-growth (décroissance) 
world.(5) On an optimistic note, today economics students are demanding they 
An entire academic field of “post-development studies” deals with this. See the work of some (5)
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are taught differently, by incorporating historical, broader and more inclusive 
study of economics theories, and recognizing that economics is a social science 
(Russell, 2014). Various student organizations(6) throughout the world have 
joined in a common push for “a complete overhaul of curricula” at economics 
departments, in recognition of what heterodox economic theory proponent Steve 
Keen (2011) calls “extraordinarily bad thinking” for which economics 
departments are the source of. Rethinking human security needs to recognize, 
reflect on and incorporate these developments into its own debate.  
2. Lack of Focus on “the West”
So far human security engagements with the West have only focused on the 
(neo) liberal state model as a collective or contractual enterprise through which 
free individual citizens pursue their security. Critical voices have questioned the 
Western obsession with building democratic institutions and the applicability of 
the liberal model in the non-Western world pointing to the fact that the liberal 
state model and approach to security is just one of many alternative models 
through which people have sought collective security. They have consequently 
made the case for a pluralization of structures and models rather than the current 
push for world-wide standardization and uniformization. 
A fundamental problem that human security going forward needs to address 
is the basic assumption from which scholars have began their analyses until 
now: that the West has been successful in providing for the human security of its 
citizens. This is because the liberal democratic process, through which collective 
security is sought and the liberal contract with the state is renewed, has been 
thought to be enough to guarantee it (despite the presence of numerous pockets 
(6)
of its most notable proponents: Arturo Escobar, Gustavo Estava, Gilbert Gist, Serge Latouche, 
Ivan Illich, Vandana Shiva, Wolfgang Sachs or Majid Rahnema. A useful reference is Majid 
Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree (Eds.)(1997) The Post-Development Reader, London: Zed 
Books. 
See, for example, Rethinking Economics, PEPS-Économie (Pour un Enseignement Pluraliste 
dans le Supérieur en Économie), or Estudios Nueva Economia.
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of insecurity in the West). However, we need to rethink this assumption. This 
need arises from two different angles. 
First, is to do with the structural changes that have taken place over the past 
decades in the West -captured by concepts such as “risk”, “securitization”, 
“control”, and the more recent “discursive disappearance of the securing agency 
itself”, as Chandler (2011) put it. More generally, a shift has occurred from a 
reactive to a proactive (or preventive) security culture, that is, from securitizing 
against everything that is known about a clearly identified enemy and his 
harmful intentions, to securitizing against everything that is potentially 
dangerous in the absence of clear knowledge and irrefutable proof, but based on 
computed calculations, estimations and predictions. This proactive security 
culture of ours takes as foundational principle the notion of risk (cf. Beck, 1999) 
and the assumption of one’s ability to predict, assess and manage future 
developments, and effectively “bend history” in accordance with current plans 
and projections. 
In the West, when future does not turn out to be quite as predicted and 
prepared for, blamed on “faulty” expert knowledge or insufficient preparedness, 
as in the US 9/11 terrorist attacks, that is when the link with the “state of 
exception” (cf. Agamben, 2005) is created, and the “culture of control” (cf. 
Garland, 2001) takes over, allowing for the political (re)construction of risk and 
the legitimization of illiberal means of governance (surveillance, regulatory 
procedures) presented as acceptable within the liberal model. Alarm signs have 
already been raised about the implications of such governing practices onto the 
liberal state, but this linkage could further benefit from a sustained analysis by 
human security scholars.
It took something like Hurricane Katrina in the US and more recently the 
triple (earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima nuclear explosions) disasters of 3/11 
in Japan for scholars (Sygna, O’Brien & Wolf, 2013; Bacon & Hobson, 2014; 
Bacon, Hobson & Cameron, 2014) to seriously start thinking about the 
applicability of human security lenses to the analysis of Western domestic 
contexts; yet this development is far from being accepted orthodoxy. To what 
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extent are human security scholars correct in assuming that the industrialized 
liberal states in the “West” (continue to) provide for the human security of their 
citizens? What is/should be the role of non-state actors in that provision? The 
lack of accountability of the main stakeholders in the Fukushima nuclear disaster 
(Yamauchi, 2014) and the reluctance of the Japanese government to recognize 
and learn from the mistakes it made in the management of the man-made 
disaster at Fukushima is a worrying sign regarding the ability of Western states 
to do so- even one as advanced and supposedly disaster sensitive and prepared 
one as that of Japan (Kingston, 2014; Hobson, 2014).
Second, and related to the first, is to do with the changes that have taken 
place in the debate about human security and the recent attempts to de-centralize 
the Western, liberal, secular, developed, etc., foundations on which human 
security has been premised. This is inextricably linked with the fact that today’s 
cacophony of visions, actors and interests vis-à-vis security in the West is in 
many ways the result of an intensification of the security dilemmas and tensions 
inherent in the liberal model. The incipient “discursive disappearance of the 
security agency itself” under way in post-industrial Western societies, Chandler 
(2011) argues, runs parallel with a recasting of the state role regarding security 
and the means (both liberal and illiberal) through which it is to facilitate the 
individual ability and responsibility in providing for their own security, which is 
also echoed in the questioning of the centrality of the Western styled state and 
security thinking. 
Human security scholars need to pay attention to the implications of the 
post-liberal developments, through which the re-imagining of the liberal 
individual as an activated and responsible individual charged with the provision 
of his/her own security is undertaken. What does this do for people who are not 
or can not be activated and are unable to provide for their own security? How is 
this transformation relevant for the human security of individuals in the post-
liberal Western context? In more concrete terms, for example, what is the 
relationship between an aging post-industrial society’s reliance on immigrant 
labor, and the discourse of activating and responsibilizing of the individual for 
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the provision of his/her own security? How does this affect the assumption that 
Western liberal states are successfully providing the human security of their 
citizens? 
The (European) state’s focus on security as the ultimate aim of government 
emerged in the context of the competition for material resources. This has been 
inextricably linked with a territorialization and centralization of state power that 
coincided with the commodification of the commons and the self (beginning 
with the early phases of the industrial revolution in Europe). The context of the 
21st century (global environmental and demographic pressures) does not sustain 
anymore the monopolistic/ individualistic ownership of resources, but instead 
requires a collective management and ownership of those resources. 
On an optimistic note, the younger generation seems to place a higher 
premium on access rather than ownership (which might be in part due to the 
technology of Internet and virtual world), that is why a reconsideration of our 
approach to security and its nature might not only be imperative, but also 
possible. This change is important as it can potentially become a platform from 
which a new interpretation of collective security as “collaborative commons” 
(cf. Rifkin, 2014) could emerge. However, the Internet presents us not only with 
new opportunities, but also with new challenges that directly affect the security 
of Western states- much more than the Rest- because of the their degree of 
dependence on it. Can we really talk about human security today without 
thinking about the security of the cyber space, when increasingly more aspects 
of our daily lives (water and sewage systems, health system, communications, 
etc.) become dependent on it (Von Solms, 2014)?
Where critical human security can make its mark is towards forging a new 
understanding of security based on a spirit of shared responsibility for our 
common future not only within and among the Western states, but more 
importantly, by acknowledging and allowing non-Western world an equal say in 
this global partnership. Many of the problems emanate from the superiority 
complex and the attitude of the West to dictate to the Rest, requiring the latter 
follows in its footsteps. This brings me to the third issue: the relationship 
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between humanity and security.
3. Relationship Between Humanity and Security
Human security analyses have until very recently taken the meaning of both 
“human” and “security” as “givens”, failing to recognize the particular modern 
Western and liberal understandings that underpin their claims to universality and 
positing a uniformity where in reality there is a complexity of social-cultural 
contexts and associated interpretations (Davies, 2013). 
Some critics (Pasha, 2011; Richmond, 2011) have already argued that 
behind the universal “human” there is in fact the assumption of a particular 
meaning of the modern, liberal, secular and active individual possessing rights 
and responsibilities that originated in the Western context and that is not to be 
assumed throughout the world. Taking this argument a step further Shani (2013) 
has argued for a de-secularization of the “human” which is not to be understood 
in the Habermasian senses of “post-secularity which privilege the universality of 
(post) secular reason”, but as a recognition of the “multiple religio-cultural 
contexts in which human dignity is embedded” (p. 65). The problem lies, in his 
view, not only in the domination of a Western secular view of the human, but 
also in the way in which it forbids the “articulation of plural claims from a 
multiplicity of different religio-cultural traditions”, and de-legitimizes their 
respective political and cultural dimensions (which he exemplifies in the Islamic 
or Sikh traditions).
As Pasha and his collaborators (2013) have argued recently, critical human 
security studies have yet to unsettle the hegemonic thinking that identifies 
difference as a problem, despite the discourse of the universality of human needs 
and concerns. “Although this emphasis on the equal dignity of mankind is 
shared by other religio-cultural traditions and is not specific to the Judeo-
Christian tradition, the universalistic and secular language used to articulate the 
concept occludes its specifically religious origins. In short, the substantive 
concept of human dignity cannot be assumed a priori from the abstract 
notion of the ‘human’ but must be historically and culturally understood. 
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Reconceptualizing Human Security can therefore only be achieved through an 
engagement with the various conceptions of human dignity which exist in other 
religious and cultural traditions which are no less ‘universal’ than that of the 
West” (Emphasis in original) (pp. 74-5).
It is indisputable that all societies and cultures have notions of human rights, 
but the way in which these are conceptualized and protected varies extensively. 
If dignity and humanity are the ultimate goals of human security do we need to 
also call the concept as such? And if humanity is the aim, what is the relationship 
between humanity and security? What do we mean by security in the 21st 
century? Should security in the negative meaning of countering enemy threat 
and/or potential risk be the way in which we approach our problems in the 21st 
century? Should territorialization and individual ownership (through the 
commodification of the commons and the self) be the (only) fundamentals 
underpinning our understanding of security? 
Over the twentieth century we have witnessed different reconceptualizations 
of security. While there has been a change in the culture of security of Western 
states from one of re-action to one of pro-action, the current securitization 
practices and policies continue to be premised on the existence of an existential 
threat/enemy (to that territory and individual ownership). Moreover, more and 
more the solutions to the various security threats/challenges we face are cast in 
terms of finding new technological devices, improving our “hardware”, while 
the “software” side of it is by and large neglected. Recognizing that there is no 
100% risk-free technology and that we can never be fully prepared is imperative, 
a condition sine-qua-non to changing our perspective on security, but we also 
need to pay more attention and care to the human element, the “software”, 
underpinning the corporate cultures and modus operandi behind the 
sophisticated installations and technological protective “walls” we “fortify” our 
societies with. 
“Reconceptualizing security as emancipation (...) risks leading to greater 
securitization” (Shani, 2013, p. 74) (understood as an “extreme form of 
politicization”) because the basic foundations remain unchanged. Moreover, as 
77
Human Security’s Coming of Age
past experiences stand to testify, in practice security has a way of linking 
seemingly unrelated ideas of social progress with the most unexpected tools, 
discourses and interests that often lead to the opposite outcomes than those they 
were initially designated for. For example, the eugenic ideas of the late 19th 
century found unexpected resonance in the events of the 1930s and initially 
unrelated medical and technical innovations such as the asylum institution, 
criminal science and sterilization techniques, were linked with the Nazi 
discourse of Arian supremacy and national security in ways that justified and led 
to de-humanizing practices and unspeakable horrors.
Although the current situation cannot possibly be compared to the Nazi 
situation, as Mythen and Walklate (2006) argue, there are nevertheless 
continuities in the discourse and practice of risk, where “insecurity and 
intolerance [offer] the mechanisms whereby the notions of belonging, who is 
one of us and who is not, have the potential not only to exclude the stranger, ‘the 
Other’, but also to demonize them”, in a context where the “‘culture of fear’ 
constantly constructs and reconstructs those to be feared, those we avoid, those 
who are risky.” That is particularly why, they add, in this contemporary risk 
culture of ours, we need to move beyond seeking “biographical solutions to 
what are clearly systemic problems” and find ways to prevent people’s minds 
from becoming “factories of fear” (pp. 234-5).
This is where human security needs to make its contribution: in de-
centralizing the negative approach to security that is associated with 
territorialization and individual ownership. The sort of change that is required is 
also profoundly linked to and dependent on strong humanities (including 
religious and philosophical) studies, which however have been reduced to a 
marginal position in academia during the neoliberal age. Part of this rethinking 
of our approach to the fundamentals of our society that critical human security 
undertakes needs to also reevaluate the role of humanities and the business-like 
approach to higher education (that mainstreams and marginalizes disciplines 
based on a market logic). Critical human security scholars therefore, also need 
(indeed, have a responsibility) to engage with “teaching for human security”, 
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with the current status and organization of academic disciplines, and work 
towards allowing for alternative thinking to be fostered.
III. Conclusion
In conclusion, this article has argued that if the concept is to make a 
meaningful contribution to our world it urgently needs to engage deeper with the 
aspects and issues that have been, either or not intentionally, left out of the 
debate: the “unshakable” belief in the ability of economic development and 
growth to deliver social progress, the identification of the global South as the 
source of global human insecurity and the lack of focus on the West, and finally, 
the relationship between “humanity” and “security”.
In doing so we have to work towards bringing it out of the confines of 
traditional disciplines and their basic assumptions. We need to stop trying to “fit” 
human security within the current conceptual binaries and frameworks as we 
have been doing for the past two decades and start a different kind of theorizing 
and thinking about security that recognizes the multiplicity of meanings and 
contexts, that does not seek to replace one with another, but makes plurality its 
foundational principle accepting that people adapt and adopt different priorities 
and approaches to security depending on their particular contexts.
Only in this way will it be able to address the issues it claims to address and 
make possible a fundamental change in the practice of security. We find 
ourselves in one of those rare moments when history opens up an “opportunity 
to think collectively about our global future”, when, as ul Haq (1980) reminded 
us, we need “to examine critically the premises on which [the current 
institutions] were built in the past, and to negotiate new premises wherever the 
old assumptions have been eroded with the passage of time or new assumptions 
are required to serve the mutual interests of all nations” (p. 414).
Before I conclude, another reference to Arendt (1958) is in order. One 
fundamental characteristic of the “human condition” that Arendt described is the 
ability of human beings to begin new things. But she also emphasized that this 
ability to put new things/ideas in motion is not accompanied by the ability to 
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control or foresee where they ultimately lead. That is why it is so important, she 
argued, to assume the responsibility that comes with this sort of ability. In 
critically engaging with human security we need to recognize the opportunity it 
offers, but also assume the responsibility of starting new things when we lack 
the power to control the final destination. That is particularly because, as the 
story of development stands to prove, the “noblest causes have often had 
dramatic consequences” (Rist, 2008, p. vii). 
There are two meanings of critique we need to distinguish from: one, is the 
sense of unfavourable judgement, the other, is the Kantian sense of public 
examination and engagement with the issue at hand. The first meaning merely 
presents us with the window of opportunity for change; the change, however, 
comes neither naturally nor automatically, but rather requires engagement and 
sustained effort: that alone will allow for the fruitful valorization of the 
opportunity presented by the first meaning. In the absence of a public 
examination of the fundamental problems we are faced with, the window of 
opportunity for change we are presented with will simply be hijacked by the 
same old actors cast in a new act of the same old script, in a recurring pattern of 
critique and crisis. 
The role and responsibility of the academia is (in the absence of 
philosopher-politicians) to act as a collective social conscience that thinks about 
the greater good, and advises towards its achievement. If it is not “daring to 
disagree” in a collective engagement and debate about the fundamental 
dilemmas of social life, academia is itself becoming part of the problem, rather 
than the solution. This is where, in my view, critical human security scholarship 
has slowly began to make its contribution.
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<Summary>
Magdalena Ionescu 
Ever since it emerged in the context of UNDP two decades ago, human secu-
rity has been hailed as a new approach to security, capable of challenging the 
narrow focus and the established assumptions of the traditional concepts of secu-
rity. The body of cross-disciplinary research and policy practice that has emerged 
since then has struggled with the challenge of making the concept policy relevant 
in a way that can lead to real change in the lives of those it seeks to empower. In 
the process however, by incorporating some of the main assumptions that it was 
claiming to challenge, human security has lost its “transformative ethos” and has 
become a tool of hegemonic forces seeking to incorporate challengers and their 
tools into the structures that justify and facilitate their domination. In criticizing 
the unidirectionality of the theoretical and practical debate so far, this article ar-
gues that, if it is to make a truly meaningful contribution, human security needs 
to engage with the assumptions it has taken for granted and consequently left out 
of the debate: the belief that economic development and growth lead to social 
progress, the lack of focus on the West(7), and the relationship between “humanity” 
and “security” in the neoliberal age.
Here, “the West” also refers to those highly industrialized countries that have adopted 
principles and institutions originated in Western Europe and the US, including Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan.
(7)
